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Constitutional Democracy and the Third 
Branch 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain 
Professor Eastman, distinguished judges and academics, 
and friends: 
Thank you for the privilege of speaking before such a 
distinguished audience. I am deeply honored and moved by the 
Claremont Institute’s Reagan Jurisprudence Award. I am 
especially proud to receive it in the name of President Ronald 
Reagan because of his commitment to our fundamental 
constitutional principles—indeed, to those same founding 
principles that the Claremont Institute strives to sustain in 
American public life.  
I am also personally indebted to him as well because he 
appointed me to this Article III judgeship. I think he might well 
be pleased to know after having telephoned me that morning in 
August, 1986, that I was faithful to his trust in naming me to the 
Ninth Circuit, although I was almost rude to him when he called 
me at home one day to be assured that he “had my permission” to 
sign my nomination and to send it on to the Senate.  
As many of you know, President Reagan would never 
nominate an Article III judge with whom he had not personally 
talked. It was 7:30 in the morning in Portland, Oregon when the 
phone rang downstairs, where my wife, Maura, was preparing 
breakfast, and I was upstairs just finishing my shower. She 
shouted up the stairs that the phone call was for me, to which I 
responded, “Who is it?” She said, “I think it’s the press.” To which 
I responded, “Tell them I’ll call them back.” Well, the White House 
 United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; 
B.A., St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., University of 
Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002; LL.D. (Hon.), Lewis & Clark 
College, 2003; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Portland, 2011. The views expressed herein are 
my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of my colleagues or of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I wish to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance 
of E. Garrett West, my law clerk, in preparing these remarks.  
 This Address was delivered at Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law 
on September 15, 2018, as the Constitution Day Address for the Claremont Institute for 
the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2019 8:13 PM 
186 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
operator overheard my wife’s side of the conversation and said, 
“Madam, it’s the Press . . . ident of the United States calling.” 
Whereupon Maura shouted, “Dear, it’s President Reagan.” 
“I think I’ll take that call,” I said, and thus began a delightful 
conversation with one of the most considerate public officials that 
I have ever known. 
I 
Because we are gathered here to celebrate Constitution Day, 
and because this particular event draws inspiration from 
President Reagan’s jurisprudence, I believe it would be fitting to 
begin my remarks by returning to some of his. 
Just over thirty years ago, speaking from the East Room of 
the White House, President Reagan presided over the 
swearing-in ceremony for Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
Justice Antonin Scalia. He elaborated on the Founders ’ vision of 
an “independent” judicial branch: “For [the Founders],” he said, 
“the question involved in judicial restraint was not—as it is 
not—will we have liberal or conservative courts? They knew 
that the courts, like the Constitution itself, must not be liberal 
or conservative. The question was and is, will we have 
government by the people?”1 
Today, I would like to reflect on this timeless puzzle: How can 
a counter-majoritarian institution like the federal judiciary—an 
institution filled with judges whose appointing Presidents long ago 
left office, one that enforces laws written by long-dead drafters, and 
one that from time to time strikes down statutes written and passed 
by the people’s representatives—how can that institution possibly 
be in service of “government by the people?” The answer, I will 
suggest, is in the textualist and originalist judicial methodologies 
which, I believe, are compatible with democratic self-governance 
and uniquely promote government by the people. 
II 
A  
Let’s start with the increasingly ascendant approach to 
statutory interpretation: Textualism. Judges have looked to the 
words of legal instruments to determine their meaning for a 
 
 1 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for William H. Rehnquist 
as Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States (Sept. 26, 1986), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1268 (1986). 
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long while. Justice Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the 
Constitution, for example, wrote of that document:  
[E]very word . . . is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and 
common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, 
qualify, or enlarge it. . . . [Constitutions] are . . . fitted for common 
understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the 
people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common 
sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite 
meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.2 
Textualism as a theory of interpretation is of more-recent vintage, 
largely developed in response to the perceived excesses of the Warren 
Court and popularized by Justice Scalia.3 But, in method, textualism 
channels Justice Story. As Justice Scalia explained: Judges should 
look to “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text 
of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”4 
Though the terminology might be new, the tools are older than Justice 
Story and older even than the Constitution.5 
How, then, does textualism reinforce democratic processes? 
Primarily because textualism respects the “legislative bargain”—the 
deal struck among legislators with competing interests and 
competing constituencies.6 Passing legislation is a messy and 
haphazard business, one that Justice Neil Gorsuch recently 
described as “the art of compromises.”7 So, to a judge looking for some 
high-minded, purposive reading of the statute, such incongruities 
and idiosyncrasies might look instead like inconsistencies. But a 
statute’s foibles are not necessarily flaws, and so textualists enforce 
the law that the parties managed to pass—not the one that some of 
them, in the Court’s view, might have wanted.  
I believe the textualists’ respect for this legislative bargain 
promotes democratic self-rule. Consider, first, the perspective of the 
forward-looking political actor who hopes to pass a new law, or to 
fix an old one. Passing such legislation, he or she knows, will require 
the investment of considerable political and financial capital. Party 
leaders, for instance, might need to make the vote a matter of party 
discipline, or to offer a seat on a committee to some recalcitrant dolt. 
Likewise, citizens and interest groups can spend money or make 
calls to urge the passage of the legislation—all of which expend time 
 
 2 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 451 (1833); see also 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Joseph Story, the Natural Law, and Modern Jurisprudence, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/HL1239.pdf 
(discussing Justice Story’s theory of natural law).  
 3 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641–50 (1990). 
 4 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1997). 
 5 See STORY, supra note 2, § 400 (quoting Blackstone). 
 6 John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 431 (2005). 
 7 Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2016). 
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and treasure. But textualism promises the legislator a return on 
investment: Expend your resources, and the third-branch will 
enforce this hard-earned text; your handiwork will govern until 
someone else puts as much effort in to change it as you did. 
Relatedly, textualism ensures the democratic legitimacy of a 
court’s decision, and it reinforces the accountability of the political 
branches. When judges enforce the text that Congress wrote, the 
case is decided at the politicians’ directive. Sticking to the script is 
not only fair to the parties, but it reinforces the basic democratic 
principle that elected officials are responsible for the policies and 
practices of the government. If you don’t like the law or its 
application, then you know whom to blame: Congressmen, unlike 
federal judges, can be thrown out of office.  
These advantages of textualism perhaps partially explain its 
rapid ascendance in the broader legal culture. But we also have to 
thank Justice Scalia’s charismatic persistence that Congress means 
what it says and says what it means. Just a few years back, Justice 
Elena Kagan claimed that he “taught everybody [ ] to do statutory 
interpretation differently.”8 Because of him, she claimed, “we’re all 
textualists now.”9 And as I’ve argued elsewhere, one of his 
most-lasting legacies will likely be that he prodded judges to ask not 
what the statute should say, but what it does say.10  
Despite textualism’s ascendance among lawyers, politicians 
and commentators often seem not to understand the basic 
distinction between the lawmaking role of the political branches 
and the interpretive role of the courts. Justice Gorsuch, you will 
recall, was harangued during his Senate hearings for a dissent he 
wrote on the Tenth Circuit.11 Then-Judge Gorsuch would have 
sided with a trucking company that fired a driver for abandoning 
his broken-down vehicle in subzero temperatures. “It might be fair 
to ask whether [the company’s] decision was a wise or kind one,” 
he wrote. “But it’s not our job to answer questions like that. 
Our only task is to decide whether the decision was an illegal one.”12 
 
 8 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with 
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes , YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Antonin 
Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303 (2017). 
 11 Michelle Mark, Al Franken slams Gorsuch over ‘absurd’ dissent in frozen-trucker 
case: ‘It makes me question your judgment,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/senators-grill-gorsuch-over-absurd-dissent-in-frozen-
trucker-case-2017-3 [http://perma.cc/9PEM-G6XY]. 
 12 Transam Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., No. 15-9504, 2016 WL 3909526, at *7 
(10th Cir. July 15, 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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Whether right or wrong on the merits, Justice Gorsuch precisely 
described the only legitimate ground for his decision. Critics of 
such principled textualism don’t just misunderstand the role of the 
federal judge, but they also fail to see the pro-democratic benefits 
of the textualist approach. 
B 
Textualism’s cousin, originalist constitutional interpretation, 
gets regularly maligned as somehow deeply anti-democratic—the 
traditional name for the objection being the “dead hand” 
problem.13 The objection goes something like this: The 
Constitution claims to speak for “We the People,” but “We did not 
adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.”14 
Originalism, they say, does not secure a “government of laws and 
not of men,” but a government of the dead and not of the living. 
Originalists have a series of responses. The first, of course, is 
that the dead hand argument fails any form of law, or at least 
anything short of rule by continuous and unanimous consent. I’ve 
been on enough three-judge panels over the last thirty-two years 
to know that that won’t work. However, I don’t want to focus on 
the reductio ad absurdum response to the dead hand problem. 
Instead, I want to make the positive case that this “rule of the 
dead” is good for the “rule of the living.”  
Indeed, the Constitution’s foundational nature sets in place 
the structural and electoral pre-requisites of democratic 
governance. In this age when the Court is better known for its 
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Obergefell than it is for Myers 
v. United States and Noel Canning,15 we often forget that the 
Constitution pays careful attention to the unglamorous details of 
nation-building—for instance, how many votes does it take to 
demand that the Senate or the House record the “Yeas and Nays 
of the Members?”16 Likewise, while we simply assume the 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment, the Founders 
carefully calibrated this system of lawmaking.17  
 
 13 Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1127 (1998); Reva Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1399, 1405 (2009). 
 14 Siegel, supra note 13, at 1399. 
 15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (same-sex marriage); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (presidential 
removal authority); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (recess appointments). 
 16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Note: A one-fifth vote will suffice. Id.  
 17 See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–51 (1983). 
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With these and many other such rules, the Constitution 
determines who gets to act on behalf of the nation, what they may 
do, and how they have to go about it. And settling those 
preliminary structural questions frees up today’s political actors 
to focus on the questions of the day. Judge Michael McConnell 
offers a useful analogy: “The rules of basketball do not merely 
constrain those who wish to play the game, but also make the 
game possible.”18 Speech without grammar is gibberish, and 
democracy without structure is mob rule. The Founders wrote the 
rules of the game in 1787, and their rulebook makes democratic 
politics possible in 2018. 
But such response to the dead hand problem does not entirely 
dispense with the objection. The judicial branch, of course, has the 
authority to “say what the law is,”19 and when the Constitution’s 
higher law conflicts with an act of Congress or a state legislature, then 
the Supremacy Clause—to say nothing of our oaths of office—dictate 
that such law must be set aside. The “rules of the game” response to 
the dead hand problem cannot easily explain cases like Brown 
v. Board, 20 or West Virginia v. Barnette,21 or even Heller.22 In these 
cases, the judge’s role is quite simply to declare the will of elected 
officials null and void. How can judicial review be anything but a 
constraint on the right of the people to govern themselves? 
Well, perhaps the best response is that we embrace the rule of 
the dead so as to affirm the possibility of the people’s living 
sovereignty. With language echoing the Declaration of Independence, 
Chief Justice John Marshall explains as much in Marbury 
v. Madison: “The basis on which the whole American fabric has been 
erected” is that “the people have an original right to establish, for 
their future government, such principles as . . . shall be most 
conducive to their happiness.”23 But because the “exercise of this 
original right is a very great exertion,” and because it neither 
“can [ ] nor ought [ ] be frequently repeated,” the principles “are 
deemed fundamental” and are “designed to be permanent.”24 Put 
simply, We the People have the right to establish fundamental 
political commitments—like the freedom of speech and religion, or 
the equality of persons of every race. Enshrining these principles is a 
“very great exertion,” and so those commitments cannot be rendered 
 
 18 Michael McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1130 (1997). 
 19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 20 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (school desegregation). 
 21 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (enjoining enforcement 
of regulation requiring students to say the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 22 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (firearms for self-defense in the home).  
 23 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
 24 Id.  
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impermanent by any mere agent of the government—whether that 
agent be an unelected judge or an elected legislature. 
C 
These democratic benefits of faithful adherence to the written 
law, whether a congressional statute or the Constitution itself, 
should seem especially salient today, when judicial nominations 
have become so contested, so bitter, and so focused on the nominees’ 
political views. For instance, Senator Cory Booker grabbed 
headlines when he suggested that supporting Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh’s nomination made you “complicit in evil.”25 And of 
course, as I’m sure you all recall, there were the sordid anti-Catholic 
insinuations against Judge Amy Coney Barrett. 
The most significant cause of today’s political angst, I suspect, 
is the well-known Supreme Court cases that removed political 
questions from the democratic process without even a basis in the 
Constitution’s text and structure. Roe v. Wade, the most egregious 
case of judicial fiat, compelled Professor John Hart Ely, who was 
anything but a right-wing hack, to say: “[Roe] is bad because it is 
bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law 
and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”26 If the 
Supreme Court can do that, who needs Congress?  
But mandated social change at the ukase of the Supreme 
Court doesn’t only take politics away from the politicians; it also 
compromises judicial independence, because it turns courtrooms 
into partisan battlegrounds when those political battles should be 
happening across the street in the United States Capitol.  
Nevertheless, I have hope that the courts will return to their 
proper role. With Justice Gorsuch, another principled textualist 
and originalist has joined court. And I also hope that one day these 
methodologies can be the default commitment of appointees of 
both political parties. After all, textualism and originalism are 
methodological commitments that can, and should, transcend 
political parties.  
For instance, Yale Law School Professor Akhil Amar, described 
by the New York Times as a “liberal originalist,” argued long before 
Heller that the Constitution included a personal right to keep a gun 
 
 25 Igor Bobic, Cory Booker Suggests Supporting Brett Kavanaugh Makes One ‘Complicit’ In 
Evil, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cory-booker-
brett-kavanaugh-complicit-evil_us_5b59dce2e4b0fd5c73ccbb0e [http://perma.cc/RBG2-327R]. 
 26 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 
920, 947 (1973). 
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in one’s home for self-defense27—though some originalists, of course, 
might read the Second Amendment more broadly than he. He also 
testified on Judge Kavanaugh’s behalf and has praised him for his 
“studious” attention to “the Constitution’s original meaning.”28 To 
take another example, Justice Kagan often writes careful textualist 
opinions for the Court that show her methodological seriousness.  
My point is not to say that originalism and textualism mean 
that judges will always agree on the meaning of the text. But 
shared methodologies offer a neutral and a-political basis for 
good-faith disagreement. 
III  
So far, then, I have advanced the argument that textualism 
and originalism are not just compatible with democratic self-rule, 
but rather that they’re good for it.  
To illustrate that point, let me briefly discuss a few of the Court’s 
cases from last term. In these decisions, the Supreme Court 
reinforced the Constitution’s structural and electoral protections. 
Fair warning: These are technical, structural, lawyerly opinions that 
may also, for the non-lawyers, be intensely soporific. 
A 
The first case is Lucia v. SEC.29 There, the Court considered 
whether Administrative Law Judges (or, “ALJs” as they’re called) at 
the Securities and Exchange Commission were “officers of the United 
States” or simply employees. The question mattered because Article 
II prescribes only two mechanisms by which a person can be 
appointed to an “office”: First, the default rule is that a person must 
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate; second, 
Congress “may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”30 No one argued that the ALJs had been 
appointed in accordance with Article II. So by applying past 
precedent, the Court concluded that the ALJs were “officers of the 
United States” that were subject to the strictures of the 
Appointments Clause. Therefore, it vacated the order from the 
administrative adjudication. 
 
 27 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, NEW REPUBLIC (July 11, 1999), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/73718/second-thoughts [http://perma.cc/6ZNW-9WU8]. 
 28 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Liberal’s Case for Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-trump.html. 
 29 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Lucia reinforces the Constitution’s pro-democratic 
structural protections. As Justice Thomas ’s concurrence 
elaborated, the Appointments Clause “maintains clear lines of 
accountability—encouraging good appointments and giving the 
public someone to blame for the bad ones.”31 In other words, the 
Constitution sets in place structural rules that make sure that 
elections matter: If the Department of Defense, or Housing and 
Urban Development, or the Environmental Protection Agency is 
behaving badly, then you know it’s the President’s fault. Here, 
the Court issued a seemingly anti-democratic decision; it 
declared null a congressionally approved method of hiring ALJs. But 
the Court did so in order to further the Constitution’s higher 
mandate: Meaningful accountability within the executive branch as 
expressed in the text itself. 
Similarly, Murphy v. NCAA is a federalism case that ensures that 
state elections matter.32 In this case, the Court struck down the 
provision in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act that 
makes it unlawful for a State to “authorize” sports gambling schemes. 
The problem with the statute was not that it concerned some subject 
matter beyond the reach of Congress’s enumerated powers (does 
anything these days?), but that it specifically “dictate[d] what a state 
legislature may and may not do.”33 In the Court’s language, the 
regulations “commandeered” the organs of state government.34 Such 
commandeering violates the Constitution: While Congress may 
regulate individuals, it has no authority to regulate directly the 
conduct of states; such a directive would be incompatible with the 
Constitution’s system of “dual sovereignty.”35  
Like Lucia, the decision in Murphy strikes down a duly enacted 
congressional statute, but it does so in the service of the 
Constitution’s commitment to democratic self-rule. As the Court 
mentions, the “anti-commandeering rule promotes political 
accountability” because it maintains clear lines of responsibility.36 
When Congress regulates individuals, citizens know that Congress 
is to blame for bad laws; when Congress tries to regulate states who 
then regulate individuals, the lines of responsibility become blurred. 
Citizens must know which politicians to vote out of office. Similarly, 
commandeering would have allowed Congress to pass the costs of 
regulating onto the states, who then would have to fund Congress’s 
 
 31 Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 32 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 33 Id. at 1478. 
 34 See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may 
not “commandeer” state governments); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (same).  
 35 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475. 
 36 Id. at 1477. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2019 8:13 PM 
194 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
mandate. The anti-commandeering rule, however, ensures that 
Congress must bear the burden for the programs it enacts. Once 
again, the Court’s decision in Murphy ensures meaningful 
accountability for Congress. 
As an aside, it’s also worth noting that the majorities in 
each of these two cases crossed traditional ideological lines. 
Justice Kagan’s opinion in Lucia was joined by each of the 
Republican-appointed Justices, though Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch concurred in a more-detailed originalist reading of 
Article II. Likewise, Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion in Murphy was 
joined entirely by Justice Kagan and mostly by Justice Stephen 
Breyer. This cross-ideological agreement is a good sign; it tends to 
demonstrate the Court’s independence. 
IV 
Before I close, I would like to return again to President 
Reagan’s speech at the swearing-in of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Scalia. There, the President mentioned at least two areas 
of ongoing struggle to nurture and to preserve the structure of 
government established by the Constitution. 
The first struggle is within the judicial branch itself, as Judges 
and Justices attempt to stay true to their oaths to “bear true faith 
and allegiance” to the Constitution. President Reagan quotes 
Justice Felix Frankfurter: “The highest exercise of judicial duty is 
to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the 
law.”37 Indeed, Judges and Justices must resist the temptation to 
follow personal preferences over the Constitution. This temptation 
is especially great in hard cases, when it’s important to have 
judges who both care deeply about the Constitution’s text and 
structure and have the sharpest legal minds. President Reagan 
praised both qualities in Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, and he turned out to be right about both. So far, Justice 
Gorsuch also seems to have both qualities. He has not been afraid 
to write separately, and he has not been afraid to disagree with his 
colleagues on originalist grounds. This independence of mind will 
serve the Court well, and we can hope that Judge Kavanaugh, if 
and when he’s confirmed, will share similar qualities.38 
The second struggle that President Reagan mentioned is one 
within the United States at large. President Reagan, at the close 
 
 37 Reagan, supra note 1. 
 38 Note, this Address was given prior to Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation and swearing in.  
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of the speech, pointed out that the entire citizenry must work to 
preserve the constitutional structure:  
We the people are the ultimate defenders of freedom. We the people created 
the Government and gave it its powers. And our love of liberty and our 
spiritual strength, our dedication to the Constitution, are what, in the end, 
preserves our great nation and this great hope for all mankind.39  
Nurturing this dedication to the Constitution among citizens is 
a worthy and difficult task, but on it hangs the health of this nation’s 
great constitutional system. I commend the Claremont Institute, and 
all of you in this room, for your dedication to sustaining our Founding 
principles, and I am honored to be recognized for my small part in 
this noble effort. Thank you all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 Reagan, supra note 1.  
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